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Directional Modulation Enhanced 
Retrodirective Array 
Y. Ding and V. Fusco 
 
Unlike the mathematical techniques adopted in the classical 
cryptographic technology at the higher protocol layers it is shown that 
characteristics intrinsic to the physical layer can be exploited to secure 
useful information.  In this paper we show that a retrodirective array, 
RDA, can be made to operate more securely by borrowing directional 
modulation, DM, concepts. The new approach provided in this paper 
allows DM to operate in a multipath environment. Previously DM 
systems could only operate in free-space. 
 
Introduction: The lack of a physical boundary surrounding wireless 
transmission makes confidential information that is transmitted 
wirelessly vulnerable to interception [1]. Key-based cryptographic 
technologies inserted at the higher protocol layers are currently used to 
secure data transmission. However these algorithms may eventually be 
compromised through massive computational breakthrough. In order to 
gain fundamental level security, i.e., information theoretical security, 
[2], encryption has to be performed at the physical-layer at the point 
where the interchange between bits of information and modulated 
signals takes place. 
A retrodirective antenna array (RDA) has the property of 
retransmitting a signal back along the path along which a co-frequency 
pilot tone signal was incident irrespective of spatial and/or temporal 
variations in the propagation path [3]. It is shown in Section II that by 
combining directional modulation (DM) spatial scrambling techniques, 
defined in [4] and [5], with RDA methods that an additional dynamic 
factor is introduced which enable secure communications in static 
multipath environments while preserving static as well as free space 
wireless channel secure performance. This is beyond what can be 
achieved by conventional RDA systems, dynamic multipath only, and 
DM systems, free space only. This DM enabled RDA configuration is 
validated by two simplified static multipath wireless channel models in 
Section III. Conclusions are drawn in Section IV. 
 
Directional Modulation (DM) Enhanced Retrodirective Array (RDA): 
With regard to the secrecy performance, it has been previously shown 
that the RDA works best in dynamic multipath-rich environments [3], 
[6]. In order to extend RDA application to a static multipath wireless 
channel scenario, we show how the DM concept, [4], [5], can be 
borrowed to enable and enhance physical layer secrecy performance. 
In order to apply the DM technique onto the RDA method we 
proceed as follows:  
The normalised channel vector between a RDA and the intended 
receiver is denoted as H, of which each entry is the conjugated pilot 
tone signal detected by each antenna in the RDA, subject to an identical 
scaling factor for power normalisation. The pilot tone is transmitted 
from a place where the intended legitimate receiver is located. Similar 
to the orthogonal vector concept proposed in [5] for DM, orthogonal 
vectors, Wov , can be generated in the null space of the conjugated 
channel vector, , H*,  ‘[ ]*’ refers to the vector conjugation operator. 
After the orthogonal vectors are generated, they can be combined 
with the phase conjugation output of a conventional RDA, i.e., H. 
 
DmH†(H+Wov) = Dm(H†H+H†Wov) = Dm||H||2                  (1) 
 
In (1) it is noted that the transmitted information data, Dm for the mth 
symbol, can be recovered by a receiver positioned at the pilot tone 
location, since detected signals at this location are unaffected by the 
artificially injected vector Wov, i.e., H†Wov = 0, operator ‘[ ]†’ denotes 
complex conjugate transpose (Hermitian). However, for receivers at 
other positions, the channel vector H becomes G, and Wov and G* are 
not orthogonal, G†Wov ≠ 0. Thus the detected signals Sm are additionally 
corrupted by this artificially injected interference Wov at locations away 
from the pilot tone location, see (2). 
 
                  Sm = DmG†(H+Wov) = Dm(G†H+G†Wov)                        (2) 
 
DM Enhanced RDA Example Simulations: In this section the operation 
of DM enabled RDAs in static multipath environment is illustrated via 
two examples. The first one uses a simplified two-ray model shown in 
Fig. 1. An interrogating receiver is positioned along the boresight (θ1 = 
90°) of an N-by-1 uniformly half wavelength, λ/2, spaced RDA, at a 
distance of 100λ, and N is set to 7. An ideal electromagnetic reflector of 
infinite size is placed perpendicular to the RDA. Its purpose is to reflect 
a portion of the co-frequency pilot tone radiated from the intended 
receiver location towards the RDA which in the example here is at an 
incident angle of θ2 = 150°. The phase centre of the RDA is chosen as 
its geometric centre, i.e., the 4th array element, without loss of generality 
the radiation pattern of each antenna in the array is assumed to be 
identical and isotropic. 
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Fig. 1 Two-ray model of an N-by-1 RDA. 
 
Following design principles described in the last section, a DM 
enabled RDA, based on the two-ray model in Fig. 1, is constructed for 
Gray-coded QPSK transmission. The far-field radiation patterns at a 
distance of 100λ to the RDA for each QPSK symbol are presented in 
Fig. 2. In this example the DM power efficiency (PEDM), which 
describes what percentage of total radiated energy is utilized for useful 
information transmission, defined as (25) in [6], is held at 50%. It can 
be seen in Fig. 2 that only at the pilot tone location the magnitudes of 
the four QPSK symbols overlap each other, and their phases are 90° 
spaced, indicating that a standard QPSK constellation is formed. The 
constellation patterns detected in all other locations are distorted, an 
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Fig. 2 Normalized electric field at a distance of 100λ to the RDA along 
spatial directions from 0° to 150° for each unique QPSK symbol 
transmitted.  
a   Normalised magnitude patterns 
b   Phase patterns 
1 
 
aspect that cannot be achieved by a conventional RDA in a purely static 
multipath wireless channel. 
In order to further investigate the performance advantage a multipath-
rich environment illustrated in Fig. 3 is considered. In this example a 
one dimensional 7-element RDA with λ/2 spacing, operating at 2.4 
GHz, is placed in a 2.5×2.5×2.5 m3 metal cube, and a 1.5×1.5 m2 square 
metal wall is inserted between the RDA and the intended receiver to 
prevent line-of-sight transmission, Fig. 3. We use the wave propagation 
software WinProp version 11.06 [7] to generate the transmission 
coefficients between each transmit antenna element and each point in 
the two dimensional (2-D) 1×2.5 m2 simulation area consisting of 
160×64 pixels. We assume that pixel (80, 32) represents the intended 
receiver location. The 7 metallic plates, i.e., 6 sides of the cube and one 
metallic wall in the cube, have a thickness of 5 mm, and their reflection 
loss is 0.05 dB, and diffraction loss is between 8 to 15 dB. In the 
simulation up to 100 rays with largest energy between each transmit 
antenna and each pixel in the simulation area are calculated, and then 
summed to get the transmission coefficients. 
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Fig. 3 Metal shielded cube model for multipath-rich wireless 
transmission. 
 
With the obtained transmission coefficients the simulated electric 
fields radiated by the conventional RDA in the 2-D simulation area are 
depicted in Fig. 4a. The field at the intended receiver location is 
normalized to 0 dB. From Fig. 4a it is observed that a large portion of 
the space in the plane of the receiver has field power larger than 0 dB, 
and in this static multipath environment information recovery is 
unimpaired. This is validated by bit error rate (BER) simulations when 
106 random Gray-coded QPSK symbols are transmitted through this 
conventional RDA system, see Fig. 4b, the details of the BER 
calculation method can be found in [4].  Here the signal to noise ratio 
(SNR) at the intended receiver location is set to 15 dB, and the AWGN 
contribution is identical over the entire simulated area. 
However when the DM functionality is enabled by randomly 
updating the Wov vector on a per symbol transmitted basis the error free 
areas are significantly reduced, while the signals detected at the 
intended receiver location are unaffected, i.e., BER = 0, see Figs. 5a and 
5b for different system PEDMs. The remaining error free zones, other  
  
  
                            a                                                         b 
Fig. 4 Normalised Electric field and corresponding BER simulation 
results when SNR is set to 15 dB in conventional RDA system.  
a   Normalized electric fields in the 2-D simulation area 
b   The corresponding BER simulation results when SNR is set to 15 dB 
at the intended receiver location 
  
                            a                                                         b 
Fig. 5 BER simulation results in the 2-D simulation area in dynamic 
DM enabled RDA systems for various PEDMs. SNR is set to 15 dB at the 
intended receiver location. 
a   PEDM = 50% 
b   PEDM = 9.1% 
 
than the intended receiver location, in Fig. 5 is because of high 
information power detected in these areas, concurrent with high 
correlation between H and G, which makes artificial interference 
ineffectively injected. However it can still be concluded that the higher 
the injected interference power, namely the lower the PEDM, the better 
the secure performance that the hybrid system can achieve. 
 
Conclusion: In this paper two techniques, RDA (which adds physical 
layer security only in dynamic multipath environments) and DM (which 
adds physical layer security only in multipath free environments) were 
combined to result in a DM enhanced RDA system which operates 
under static as well as dynamic multipath wireless channel conditions. 
Example DM enabled RDA systems carrying QPSK were synthesized 
and their BER performance obtained. It is concluded that the hybrid 
system enables the decodable spatial areas to be reduced in such a 
fashion as to significantly lower the possibility of interception by 
eavesdroppers.  
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